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When you first hear that all-too-common message that you’ll
have to wait—‘‘All our operators are busy. Your call is important to
us and will be answered soon.’’—you’re likely to accept your fate
and gaze at the street scene outside your window or doodle on your
notepad. But as time passes and still no one has answered, slowly
you start to disengage from all other activities—you turn away from
the window, you stop doodling—and, as your expectation heightens
(‘‘Surely it must be my turn by now.’’), you concentrate all your
attentional resources on hearing the operator’s voice.
The ever-heightening temporal expectation in this everyday
scenario mirrors the experimental phenomenon of the ‘‘hazard
function’’—the increasing conditional probability over time that
an event will occur given that it has not already occurred [1,2].
Probability is at its lowest immediately after having been put on
hold, but increases monotonically with elapsing time as you
become more and more convinced that, surely by now, the
operator must soon reply (Figure 1A). The objectively increasing
conditional probability (and, hence, the subjectively increasing
sense of temporal expectation) over time relies on the predictive
power of the unidirectional flow of time, or ‘‘time’s arrow’’ [3].
Since time flows inexorably forward (at least at the psychological,
macroscopic level), an event that we expect to occur, but has not
yet occurred, must do so at some time in the future.
Mounting Expectations Improve Performance
The ability to anticipate the timing of an event allows an
organism to optimize behaviour and, thus, conserve precious
resources. Experimentally, it has been known for almost a century
now that as the delay (or ‘‘foreperiod’’) between a warning cue and
a response signal steadily increases, so too does the speed of
responding to that signal [4] (Figure 1B). One long-standing
theory, proposed to account for this effect, is the so-called
‘‘strategic’’ account [5], in which motor preparation processes are
honed as a function of the increasing conditional probability of
signal appearance over time. This honing process prepares the
subject to respond as quickly as possible when the signal eventually
appears. Although an alternative model, based on classical
(Pavlovian) learning rules, has also been recently proposed [6],
both models depend upon the inherently predictive nature of
time’s arrow to formulate their hypotheses.
Yet making use of time’s arrow is not the only effective strategy
for predicting event timing. Tapping your foot in time to a musical
beat makes use of fixed or rhythmic, and therefore predictable,
temporal sequences. Expecting an amber traffic light to turn red
accesses ingrained associations between sensory cues and event
timing to make temporal predictions and adjust driving behaviour
accordingly. These situations are recapitulated experimentally by
‘‘temporal orienting’’ tasks, in which an abstract cue informs
subjects that a target is likely to appear after a prespecified short
delay or long delay [7,8]. This task was originally adapted from the
classic spatial orienting of attention task devised by Posner [9], in
which informative cues direct subjects’ attention to the right or left
side of a target space. Of course, any breaches in spatial
expectation are symmetrical for either side; a target appearing
unexpectedly on the left is just as disruptive as one appearing
unexpectedly on the right. However, because of the predictive
nature of time’s arrow, a target appearing later than expected is
not nearly as disruptive as one appearing sooner than expected; if
a target still hasn’t appeared by the cued interval, it has to appear
later (since it also hasn’t appeared sooner), allowing expectations
simply to be readjusted to the later time point, thus diluting the
behavioural cost of the misleading temporal information [7].
Temporally predictable stimuli are not only detected more
quickly, but perceived more accurately. For example, the timing
and pitch of auditory tones are perceived more accurately when
these tones occur at a regularly paced interval [10,11]. And visual
targets embedded within a rapidly presented stream of successive
visual distractors are identified more readily when temporal cues
inform the subject as to when the targetis likely to appear within the
stream [12,13]. Temporal predictability also enhances subjective
performance and can modulate more objective measures of brain
activity. Single-unit electrophysiological studies in monkeys and
whole-brain functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies
in humans have recently begun to identify the patterns of neural
activity and regions of the brain that characterise the neural
signature of mounting temporal expectation.
How Is Temporal Expectation Represented in the
Brain?
Contrary to critical opinion, fMRI does not simply provide a
modern-day phrenological tool for mapping out the anatomical
coordinates of distinct cognitive processes. Instead, through the use
of clever experimental design and careful modelling of the data,
fMRI allows us to ask not just where in the brain a particular process
resides, but also how it is instantiated. In a new study published in
this issue ofPLoSBiology, Cui and colleagues [14] observed increased
activation in supplementary motor area (SMA) and right superior
temporal gyrus (STG) as a function of increasing foreperiod
duration in a cued reaction-time task. Strikingly, they didn’t simply
identify areas that were increasingly activated by increasingly long
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mounting expectations over time (i.e., the hazard function). Instead,
they formulated a series of different models that described various
ways in which activity could change over time, and then calculated
which of these models best fit the data.
The particular pattern of cerebral activity they observed was
best fit by a cumulative hazard function, which provided an index
of the integrated sum of all conditional probabilities that had been
calculated over a particular foreperiod (this would correspond to
the area under the curve in Figure 1A). By contrast, the worst-
fitting model was one in which brain activity was hypothesised to
vary linearly as a function of elapsing time, with no provision for
changes in conditional probability. Taken together, these results
confirm that SMA and STG activations were not simply due to
increases in any nonspecific dynamic parameter that changes over
time—for example, motor preparation or sustained attention—but
more specifically to some evolving measure of temporal expecta-
tion that is indexed by increasing conditional probabilities.
Impressively, Cui et al. [14] not only considered the possibility
that their results could reflect nonspecific changes over time but
also, in a series of control experiments (specifically go/no-go,
countdown, and auditory analogues of their cued reaction-time
task), checked that their findings were not dependent upon motor
execution, motor preparation, or sensory modality, respectively.
Intriguingly, the SMA and STG effects were not observed during
the foreperiod, as might be expected. Previous single-cell electro-
physiologicalstudiesinmonkeyshavemeasured neuralfiringpatterns
on a moment-to-moment basis during the foreperiod, and showed
progressive changes in firing as the foreperiod evolved [15–17].
Consequently, Cui et al. [14] sought to measure similar changes in
human subjects using fMRI. But, despite several attempts to model
progressively increasing (or decreasing) changes in neural activity
during the foreperiod itself, they failed to find any brain area where
activity consistently evolved as a function of foreperiod length.
Instead, they observed two discrete bursts of activity in SMA and
STG upon presentation of the response signal after the foreperiod had
ended. Nevertheless, the relative amplitude of these bursts of activity
varied as a function of the length of the preceding foreperiod—the
longer the foreperiod, the greater the burst of activity. This is
consistent with the aforementioned effect on an integrated or
cumulative hazard function: the SMA and STG results do not
necessarily index the dynamic evolution of the hazard function over
time (i.e., during the foreperiod) but, rather, the end-result of the
computation (i.e., when the appearance of the response signal
terminates the foreperiod, thus indicating its final length and, thus, its
associated cumulative probability). What can this unexpected result
tell us about the representation of time in the brain?
The most widely cited psychological model of time is the
pacemaker-accumulator model [18]. In this model, a sensory signal
(e.g., the onset of a stimulus to be timed) triggers an accumulator to
begin counting pulses that are emitted by an internal pacemaker.
Theaccumulated pulse tallyis then passedintoworking memory for
comparison with a previously stored pulse tally. Could the
cumulative hazard function in SMA and STG [14] correspond to
this accumulation of pulses? The results of previous fMRI studies
showing preferential activity in SMA for long rather than short
durations [19,20] make this an appealing proposition. However, if
this were true, Cui et al.’s [14] data would have been equally well
described by the simplest model in which brain activity evolves
linearly with time. In fact, they showed that the inclusion of an
additional factor, the hazard function, explained the data much
more completely. The differential explanatory power of the hazard
function versus linear models indicates that these cortical effects
represent something more akin to the updating of temporal
expectations as a function of evolving conditional probabilities,
rather than simple estimation of time-in-passing.
Of course, one alternative possibility is that it may be impossible
to estimate time-in-passing without making use of the inherent
predictability of time’s arrow, thus explaining why hazard function
models fit the data so much better than simple linear ones. If this
were so, psychological models of time would have to be reworked so
that time estimation is not just a simple case of blindly accumulating
pulses as they occur, with no end-point in sight. Instead, the
requirement to estimate duration would simultaneously invoke a
Figure 1. Increasing conditional probabilities over time speed responses. (A) If an event is likely to occur after one of four possible delays with
equal probability,thenthe conditionalprobabilitythattheevent willoccur atone ofthese delays evolves over time.For example, aftera delayof 1 s, the
probability of the event occurring is 1 in 4 (i.e., 0.25). If it does not occur at 1 s, then there are three possible delays left, now giving a 1 in 3 (i.e., 0.33)
chance of occurring at the next delay. But, if it does not occur after 2 s either, there is now a 1 in 2 (i.e., 0.50) chance of it occurring at the next delay.
Finally, if it has still not occurred by 3 s, then the subject can be sure that it must certainly occur (i.e., 1.0) at the final (4 s) delay. In other words, the
objective probability of event occurrence combines with the predictive power of time’s arrow to produce changing conditional probabilities over time.
(B) As the time (or ‘‘foreperiod’’) before an event occurs gets longer, so responses to that event get faster. The speeding of reaction time typically
parallels increasing conditional probabilities over time, reflecting a state of increased preparedness to respond with passing time.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000166.g001
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in mind the likely moment of stimulus offset. In fact, including an
element of temporal expectation in models of time estimation may
actually reflect a more ecologically valid conceptualisation of how
wetime eventsintherealworld.Weveryoftenjudgethe durationof
aneventbasedonanexpectationofhowlongitnormallylasts(‘‘The
bus should have been along by now.’’), rather than timing the event
chronometrically (‘‘I’ve been waiting at the bus stop now for one
minute…two minutes…three minutes…’’).
A Functionally Distributed Anatomical Network
for Temporal Expectation
Cui et al. [14] indexed the hazard function by parametrically
modelling fMRI data as a function of foreperiod length. Previous
fMRI studies have indexed the hazard function by contrasting
trials in which temporal expectation increases as a function of time
versus those in which temporal expectation remains fixed
throughout trial duration. In a temporal orienting task, trials that
afforded time for temporal expectations to be updated during the
foreperiod engaged right prefrontal and premotor activity [21].
This result was later supported by an impressive series of
methodologically diverse neuroscientific investigations of cued
reaction-time tasks [22–25], showing that right prefrontal cortex
was necessarily implicated in the monitoring or updating of
changing conditional probabilities over time. In these studies, the
predictive nature of time-in-passing was used to increase response
speed, and this behavioural benefit was shown to be dependent
upon right prefrontal activation. On the other hand, when fixed
temporal expectations have been used to optimise response speed
(e.g., by temporally informative cues or temporally predictable
sequences), activation of left-lateralised parietal and ventral
premotor circuits is observed [7,26]. Together, these results
suggest that temporal expectations are established in left parietal–
premotor action circuits but are monitored, and potentially
updated on-line, as a function of time-in-passing, by the right
prefrontal cortex (Figure 2). Cui et al.’s [14] new findings
complement these data by showing that, once the expected signal
or event occurs, SMA and right STG provide an integrated tally of
how that expectation evolved over time.
The functional purpose of this integrated tally is still unknown,
however. Cui et al. [14] suggest it could act as a signal of
prediction error, perhaps providing feedback that might be used to
improve the accuracy of future temporal expectations (Figure 2).
Alternatively, as suggested above, it could potentially reflect an
index of accumulated time, if one accepts that time is measured
not only as a function of elapsed time but also as a function of
expected time. Although these proposals are entirely speculative,
they provide substantial fodder for future investigation. Do we ever
actually time an event without anticipating when it will end?
Electroencepholographic (EEG) studies of duration estimation in
humans have shown evidence of climbing neural activity in medial
frontal electrodes (i.e., in the region of SMA) that was
synchronised to the expected, not the objective, moment of
stimulus offset [27]. Perhaps magnetoencephalography (MEG),
with its superior temporal and spatial resolution, would provide a
more fruitful technique in the future for identifying regions of
climbing neural activity during the foreperiod itself. Such
experiments may help shed some light on the functional
mechanism of timing. Can we identify differential patterns of
neural activity that are best characterised as a linear function of
time versus patterns of activity that vary in line with increasing
conditional probabilities? Are some brain areas consistently
activated by timing regardless of task context (centralised
representation), or is time represented in functionally specialised
regions of the brain that differ depending on the sensory or motor
nature of the task (local representation)? Is there a critical window
within which timing passes from being locally represented to being
Figure 2. Temporal expectation in the brain. Fixed temporal expectations of when a visual event is likely to occur are underpinned by activity in
left premotor and parietal areas [7,26]. However, if the event has still not appeared by the expected delay, the right prefrontal cortex (PFC) [21–25]
makes use of neural indices of elapsed time (represented in functionally specialized regions of the brain e.g., in visual cortex for visual events [15]) to
update current temporal expectations (i.e., the hazard function). Once the event occurs, an integrated sum of the probability that the event would
have occurred at that time (i.e., the cumulative hazard function) is represented by the magnitude of activity in SMA and right STG [14], and allows
expectations about the onset time of future events to be updated.
doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.1000166.g002
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temporal resolution of cognitive neuroscience techniques (e.g., fast
event-related fMRI, MEG) will help answer these, and many
other, questions of time.
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